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Abstract. We extend much research that has been devoted to the effects of the EMU on 
international trade by introducing monetary regime variables in bilateral export equations with 
the objective of capturing the effects on trade of changes in monetary regimes relative the pure 
EMU effects. In addition, we make a strong attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU 
effects on trade. To identify these different effects we include three groups of countries in our 
sample: EMU countries which are also members of the EU, EU countries outside the EMU and 
non-EU countries. The last control group consists of either non-EU industrial countries or non-
EU industrial plus emerging market countries in the empirical analysis. 
 Asian experiences with inflation targeting are discussed and compared to the empirical 
results we obtain for trade effects of monetary regimes. Even if deeper monetary integration 
leads to greater trade expansion, it involves political complexity. The choice of an appropriate 
monetary regime can be a relatively simple unilateral tool for expanding trade.  
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The Impact of Monetary Regimes on International Trade: Are EU 
Experiences Relevant for Asia? 
 
1. Introduction 
The perceived success of regional integration in Europe has inspired debate in other parts of the 
world about potential economic benefits of different types of integration. In Asia in particular, 
monetary and financial integration has received attention. What are the benefits and how large 
are they? In this study we focus on trade effects of monetary integration and monetary policy 
regimes. The formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was associated with a monetary 
regime shift for most of the countries joining the currency union. Thus, trade creation effects of 
the currency union per se should be distinguished from trade volume effects of monetary regime 
shifts. From the point of view of Asian countries we ask whether substantial trade expansion can 
be achieved by the appropriate choice of monetary and exchange rate regimes without having to 
take on the political complications associated with a currency union.  
 We argue that the commonly observed trade creating effect of the formation of the EMU 
on January 1, 1999 may not be a pure single currency effect but it may be caused by reduced 
macroeconomic uncertainty in many EMU countries as a result of changes in monetary policy 
institutions, procedures and targets. Several countries that later became members of the EMU 
had pre-EMU central banks with little credibility in terms of a monetary policy targets, and the 
targets shifted strongly towards low inflation with the creation of the EMU. To the extent EMU 
effects are the result of changes in policy-making institutions, procedures and targets, the lesson 
from EMU might be that institutions and targets should be changed and the currency union itself 
could be relatively unimportant.  
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 Inflation targeting has become a common monetary policy regime and it has been 
observed by, for example, Rose (2007) that this regime contributes to exchange rate 
predictability in spite of the flexibility of exchange rates associated with this regime. Thus, we 
may ask whether a shift to inflation targeting can substitute for a currency union for countries 
seeking to expand trade.   
We extend much research that has been devoted to the effects of the EMU on 
international trade by introducing monetary regime variables in bilateral export equations with 
the objective of capturing the effects on trade of changes in monetary regimes relative the pure 
EMU effects. In addition, we make a strong attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects 
on trade. To identify these different effects we include three groups of countries in our sample; 
EMU countries which are also members of the EU, EU countries outside the EMU and non-EU 
countries. The last control group consists of either non-EU industrial countries or non-EU 
industrial plus emerging market countries in the empirical analysis. 
The selection of control groups along with other econometric issues are frequently 
identified as the cause of the sensitivity and discrepancy of the estimates of the common 
currency effects on trade in different studies (Frankel, 2008). Rose (2001), who initiated the 
research on trade effects of currency unions, found extremely large effects of currency unions on 
trade. Due to unavailability of trade data for the EMU countries at the time of study, Rose 
analyzed trade creation effects of currency unions in existence before the EMU. Using a sample 
covering 186 countries during the period 1970-1990, he finds that the value of trade among 
countries using the same currency would increase by more than 200 percent.   
Most economists found Rose’s result implausible. Much research has been devoted to 
refining the analysis. Although the estimated trade effects of a common currency have been 
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substantially reduced, the magnitude of the effects varies substantially across studies. For 
example, Persson (2001) finds the trade effect of the common currency of 13%-66%. Drawing 
conclusions based specifically on the effect of EMU, Micco et al (2003) obtain an intra-EMU 
trade effect of 7%-10% and Berger and Nitsch (2008) find the effect to be 31%.1  
Frankel (2008) reviews much of the literature with the objective of explaining the 
discrepancy among the studies. He estimates a gravity model of the euro effect on trade 
employed in earlier studies. He identifies five possible factors that could explain the discrepancy 
among estimates among those studies; i) the long-run and lag effects of the euro, ii) the bias from 
omitting variables capturing specific characteristics of a country pair, iii) causality problems, iv) 
the implausible magnitude of the estimate, and v) the comparison of the currency union effects 
for countries with different size.  Frankel’s estimates of the euro effect on trade lie within a very 
wide range from 10 percent to 200 percent. He does not introduce alternative monetary regimes, 
however. 
 In Frankel’s study, the largest euro-effect on trade is found when estimates are obtained 
within the EU sample. Time series effects are important in this case. The euro effect on bilateral 
trade flows becomes lower when using the sample of developed countries and even lower or 
insignificant in the model specification with the full sample including developing countries. The 
euro effects are also sensitive to the length of the pre- and post-EMU periods in the sample. 
Although there is evidence of significantly increasing trade among the EMU member countries 
during 1999-2002, the effect of the euro on trade did not continue to rise from 2002 through 
2006.    
                                                            
1 See Angkinand, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2009) for a comprehensive review of literature on the trade effect of a 
common currency.  
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Our empirical analysis of EU and EMU effects is based a sample of 68 countries during 
the period 1980-2007. Taking account of monetary regimes as well, the analysis is limited to the 
period of 1999-2007. Since the EMU was formed in 1999, the EMU effects identified for this 
shorter period can be thought of as cross-section effects of the EMU while the longer period 
takes into account time series effects to a greater extent.  
The disadvantage with the longer period from the point of view of drawing implications 
for Asia is that many unidentified aspects of the deepening integration within the EU may 
influence the results. We make an attempt to distinguish between EU and EMU effects, however. 
The disadvantage with the shorter period wherein cross section effects of the EMU and the EU 
are more important is that we may miss important effects unless relevant cross-section 
characteristics of counties can be identified and controlled for.  
In the following section 2 we describe the data and empirical methodology on EU-, 
EMU- and monetary regime effects on bilateral exports. The empirical results with respect to 
trade effects of the EMU, the EU and monetary regimes are reported in Section 3. In Section 4 
trade effects in percent of membership in the EU, the EMU and monetary regime groups are 
calculated taking into account that membership in these groups are overlapping. Thereafter, we 
turn in Section 5 to experiences with inflation targeting, in particular, in Asia. We show how 
trade has developed for four countries that have adopted inflation targeting and interpret these 
developments in light of the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, lessons for Asia are 
discussed in the concluding Section 6.  
 
2. Analyzing effects of EU, EMU and monetary regimes on bilateral exports: data 
and approach.  
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We estimate the effects of EMU, EU and monetary regimes on exports using the panel 
data model. Our sample includes 68 industrial and emerging market economies during 1980-
2007.  When analyzing the effect of monetary regimes on exports, the sample period coverage is 
limited to 1999-2007 due to the availability of consistent monetary regime data. 
Following Flam and Nordstrom (2003) we use bilateral exports as the dependent variable 
in an extended gravity model with dummies for EU and EMU country groups and monetary 
regime characteristics. The purpose of using bilateral exports, and not total bilateral trade flows, 
(bilateral exports plus imports) is to be able to examine whether the monetary regime of 
exporters or importers generally and more significantly affect trade. Country-pair and year- fixed 
effects dummies are included in the panel regressions in order to minimize bias caused by time 
trends and special country relationships as suggested in the existing literature.2 The model 
specification is as follows: 
Log(Export)12,t = α + β1Log(GDP)1,t+β2Log(GDP)2,t + β3 Log(POP)1,t + β4 Log(POP)2,t+ 
β5RER1,t + β6RER2,t + β7RTA12,t + γj  EU/EMUj,12,t + θkMonetary 
Regimek,1,t  + ωkMonetary Regimek,2,t +ν12 + μt + ε12,t 
 The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real value (in U.S. dollar) of bilateral 
exports from an exporting country (with subscript 1) to an importing country (with subscribe 2) 
at year t. The exports data are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (the August, 2009 
version). GDP is the real GDP (in U.S. dollar), POP is the total population, and RER is the real 
exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar. RTA is a dummy of one if two countries belong to the 
same Regional Trade Arrangement. νij  denotes the unobserved characteristics of a country pair,  
μt denotes the unobservable time effects, and εijt is an error term.  
                                                            
2 See, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Micco et al (2003) and Carrère (2006). 
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 Our main interest is the two independent variables: EU/EMU and Monetary Regime. To 
study the currency union effect and the EU effect separately, we group the countries observations 
into three groups, which are: 1) the member countries of EMU, 2) the EU countries that are not 
the EMU members including members of the European Economic Area, EEA (EU/nonEMU), 
and 3) the non-EU countries (nonEU). Table 1 reports the list of countries in each group as well 
as the year that countries become the members of EMU and EU/nonEMU.  
[Table 1 here] 
The important aspect of the EU/nonEMU that we try to capture is the internal market that 
got a boost with the 1992 program.  In creating the “internal market” with the so called “four 
motilities” of goods, services, labor, and capital, a great variety of discriminatory practices in 
markets of all kinds were removed and in some areas rules and regulation were harmonized, 
although the legal frameworks remain very different across countries in Europe. For this reason, 
EU/nonEMU includes the EU 15 plus Norway and Iceland starting in 19923. In 1999, 11 EU 
countries became EMU members while the other 6 countries remained EU/nonEMU. Greece 
became an EMU country in 2001. Remaining outside are Denmark, Sweden and the U.K., plus 
Iceland and Norway that participate in the Internal Market as members of the European 
Economic Area. In 2004, 10 countries in Eastern Europe became EU/nonEMU. The nonEU 
group for the whole period includes 6 developed countries and 32 emerging market economies, 
of which 9 are emerging Asian countries.  
 From the three groups of exporting counties and three groups of importing countries, we 
can analyze the difference of bilateral exports among nine pairs of countries; 1) EMU exports to 
EMU, 2) EMU exports to EU/Non-EMU, 3) EMU exports to non-EU, 4) EU/NonEMU exports 
                                                            
3 Austria, Finland and Sweden did not become members of the EU until 1995 but they were participating in the 
internal market. Therefore, we treat them the same way as pre-1995 EU 12 members.  
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to EMU, 5) EU/nonEMU exports to EU/Non EMU, 6) EU/NonEMU exports to non EU, 7) Non-
EU exports to EMU, 8) Non-EU exports to EU/non EMU, and 9) Non-EU exports to Non-EU.  
 The EU/EMU in the model specification above, therefore, refers to the first eight country 
pair dummies. The ninth country pair dummy capturing exports from Non-EU to other Non-EU 
countries is omitted to avoid the perfect multicollinearity.  
 Monetary Regime data in different years are obtained from the IMF’s Classification of 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks, which is available from 1999. 
IMF classifies monetary policy frameworks into five group: exchange rate anchor, monetary 
aggregate anchor, inflation targeting framework, IMF-supported or other monetary program, and 
Other frameworks (such as the conduct of monetary policy without an explicitly stated nominal 
anchor). The descriptions of these monetary regimes variables are summarized in the Table 2. 
According to the IMF data, the countries in the Euro Area are counted within the last group. 
However, in our empirical analysis the member countries of EMU are treated as inflation target 
countries as well as members of the EMU group.  
[Table 2 here] 
The nature of monetary regimes has implication for the compatibility of exchange rate 
regimes. They also represent an indirect channel through which the monetary policy has effect 
on trade through predictability of exchange rates and interest rates in particular. More 
specifically, the monetary regime data shows that countries that follow inflation targeting and 
monetary aggregate regimes tend to have more flexible exchange rate policy such as crawling 
band, managed float with no pre-announced path for exchange rate, and independent float. The 
Exchange rate anchor regime involves more rigid exchange rate policy such as arrangements 
with no separate legal tender, pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands, crawling pegs, and 
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other conventional fixed peg arrangements. The remaining two regimes, IMF supported and 
‘Other’, have countries that practice a variety of exchange rate regimes from exchange rate 
arrangements with no separate legal tender, managed float, and independent float. Table 3 
reports the exchange rate- and monetary regimes for 9 Asian economies from 1999. Note that 
some countries are classified as adopting more than one nominal anchor in conducting monetary 
policy within the same period (e.g. China has adopted both exchange rate anchor and monetary 
aggregate regimes. Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines had adopted the monetary aggregate and 
IMF-supported during the post-Asian crisis period). According to IMF, it would not be possible 
to determine which of the two monetary regimes plays the principal role in conducting monetary 
policy.  
[Table 3 here] 
3. Effects of the EU, the EMU and monetary regimes on bilateral exports 
We begin by showing the trade effects of the EMU and the EU in a baseline model 
without controlling for monetary regime characteristics in Table 4. Thereafter, monetary regime 
characteristics are introduced in Table 5. The regressions in both tables include country-pair and 
year fixed effects. In Table 4, we report results based on the sample of industrial alone (IND) and 
the sample of ALL countries (industrial and emerging market countries). According to previous 
studies, the control group matters in drawing the conclusion regarding the euro effects on 
international trade. Most studies include only countries with similar characteristics such as 
western European or OECD countries on the grounds that developing countries are too different 
to be useful as a control group. We take into account different country characteristics between 
industrial and emerging countries by including an interactive dummy for time and emerging 
market country in the regressions using a sample for ALL countries as exporters or importers.  
 
 
9
 The baseline panel regressions in Table 4 are based on the time period of 1980-2007. The 
results in both regressions based on the sample of IND and ALL show that exporters’ and 
importers’ GDPs and populations are significant with expected signs. This result is consistent to 
the gravity model where bilateral trade flows depend positively on national income of a pair of 
countries.4 The effects of bilateral real exchange rates (of exporters and importers relative to the 
dollar) and the regional trade agreement dummy, RTA, are generally significant but the sign for 
the exporter county’s real exchange rate depends on whether emerging market economies are 
included in the sample coverage.   
The eight EU and EMU dummies are generally significant. The magnitude and 
significance levels of each dummy is compared to the omitted dummy, namely the exports from 
non-EU to other non-EU countries. In both regressions, the largest coefficient is obtained from 
bilateral exports between EMU countries (EMU1 to EMU2). The next groups that have relatively 
large trade effects are between EMU and EU/nonEMU countries, and between EU/NonEMU 
countries. We discuss the relative magnitudes of coefficients below. Without controlling for 
different monetary regimes across countries, the results in Table 4 support the trade creation 
effects of both the adoption of the euro and the formation of internal markets.  
The main difference of results in the two regressions in Table 4 is when bilateral trade 
involves non-EU countries and whether the non-EU country group includes either industrial and 
emerging market countries or industrial countries alone. In the first regression using the IND 
sample, all dummies are positive and significant except the coefficient for exports from non-EU 
to EMU.  Using industrial countries as a control group, this result would indicate that the EMU 
                                                            
4 The gravity model also predicts that bilateral trade flows depends negatively on the distance between two 
countries, reflecting lower transportation and other transaction costs being associated with more trade. Since the 
country-pair fixed effects are included in the panel regressions, the distance variable, which is time-invariant, cannot 
be included due to the perfect multicollinearity.    
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has had a relatively large effect of trade among the member countries as well as from the 
member countries to all countries outside the EU and EMU. When emerging markets are 
included in the control group for EU and EMU effects, the coefficients for trade between NonEU 
countries and EU/NonEMU countries becomes negative indicating that the formation of the EU, 
as well as the formation of the EMU, may have diverted trade of members of these groups from 
Non-EU countries to other members of the same groups. Another possibility discussed below is 
that the coefficients for trade effects of the EU and the EMU capture other factors that affected 
the development of trade over time. We return to this issue below. 
[Table 4 here] 
The first column in Table 5 shows the regression for the period 1999-2007 with 
unchanged specification relative to Table 4 regressions.5 Thus, the EMU effects and the EU 
effects in Table 5 are dominated by cross-section effects of membership in these groups while 
the coefficients in Table 4 are influenced strongly by time series effects. If all relevant variables 
affecting the volume of trade between countries had been included the coefficients should be 
similar. The coefficients are very different, however, indicating substantial sensitivity to the 
regression specification as noted by Frankel (2008). In his study, the EMU effect on trade was 
significant for the period 1999-2004 but insignificant as in Table 5 when the period of the study 
was extended to 2006.  
Missing variables could affect the cross-section effects of the EMU and the EU in Table 
5 as well as the time series effects in Table 4. All regressions include year-dummies to capture 
                                                            
5 We do not report regressions using the sample of IND countries alone since there is no sufficient variation in 
observations under each category of eight dummies when the sample includes only the post-EMU period and IND 
countries.   
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time trends, as well as country pair- dummies to capture unobservable factors affecting trade 
between country pairs.  
[Table 5 here] 
  The second regression in Table 5 introduces monetary regime variables. Consistent data 
for monetary regimes from International Monetary Fund are available only from 1999. The 
period coverage in Table 5 is therefore limited to 1999-2007. The results support our argument 
for the importance of monetary policy characteristics on international trade discussed in earlier 
section. All coefficients of monetary regimes of both exporting and importing countries are 
significant with the exception of the coefficient for the money aggregate anchor regime for 
importing countries (Money2). Furthermore, in comparison with column 1 the coefficients for 
trade effects of EMU internally and between the EMU and EU/NonEMU become significant. 
They remain negative, however. 
 Turning to the question whether commonly observed EMU effects on trade can be 
explained by the shifts in monetary regimes and conduct of monetary policy of the individual 
EMU members, as opposed to by the introduction of the common currency per se, we must 
identify EMU effects more clearly and separate EMU effects from EU effects. The coefficients 
for EMU countries in the regressions include EU effects since all EMU countries are also 
members of the EU.  We return to this issue. 
In order to evaluate the relative impact of each monetary regime we perform pairwise 
significance tests for the statistical differences between coefficients for the impact of each 
regime. The results are reported in Table 6. As the Wald-Test statistics shows, the coefficient of 
the inflation targeting regime dummy for exporting countries is significantly different from other 
monetary regime dummies. The monetary regimes of importing countries seem to matter less 
 
 
12
since no single regime dominates the trade creation effect. The effects of Inflation target, Money 
aggregate and Exchange rate anchor for importing countries are not significantly different from 
one another (Table 6).  
[Table 6 here] 
4. Bilateral trade effects of joining the EU, the EMU and monetary regimes. 
 In Tables 7 and 8 we calculate the percent change in total trade of a country in one group 
with a country in the same or another group from changes in EU and EMU memberships and 
from adoption of particular monetary regimes. The percent change figures are obtained from the 
coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 showing effects on log exports. The effects on total trade of, for 
example, an EMU country with a Non-EU country (row (2) in Table 7) is obtained by taking the 
average of the percent change in exports from an EMU country to a Non-EU country and the 
percent change in exports of a Non-EU country to an EMU country. In Table 7, the percent 
changes in rows (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) are transformations of the coefficients in Tables 4 and 5. 
The data in these rows are used as inputs in calculations of EMU effects in particular since the 
EMU countries are also members of the EU and, therefore, subject to both EU and EMU effects. 
Joining the EMU may also be associated with a monetary regime shift. 
We use Table 7 to calculate internal and external EU effects on trade, as well as internal 
and external EMU effects. For example, row (8) show the bilateral internal EMU effect as the 
difference between the percent change of bilateral EMU to EMU trade (relative to bilateral Non-
EU trade) and the percent change of bilateral EU to EU trade (relative to bilateral Non-EU 
trade). The estimated internal EMU effects vary greatly depending on the specification of the 
regression. Before discussing different measures of internal EMU effects, external and internal 
EU effects as well as external EMU effects are calculated and discussed. 
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Row (1) in the table shows the external EU effect as the percent change in trade between 
an EU country outside the EMU and a non-EU country relative to trade between two Non-EU 
countries. Three out of the four regressions imply substantial trade diversion6 effects of EU 
membership in the sense that EU-membership reduces bilateral trade with non-EU countries.  
The external EMU effect in row (3) is obtained by taking the difference between row (2) 
showing the change in trade of EMU countries with Non-EU countries and row (1) showing the 
external EU effect. The result depends on which set of regressions the estimate is based on. The 
regressions for the longer period in Table 4 indicate a positive external EMU effect while the 
regressions for the shorter period in Table 5 indicate that joining the EMU adds to the trade 
diversion of EU membership. 
The changes in row (4) refer to the internal EU effect as the percent change in trade 
between two EU members outside the EMU relative to trade between two non-EU countries.  
The estimates of this effect are positive in all cases but they vary between +84 percent and +2.1 
percent. The lowest estimate is obtained when monetary regimes are included in the regressions 
for the period 1999-2007.  
Row (5) refers to changes in trade between EMU countries and EU countries outside the 
EMU relative to trade between Non-EU countries Thus, these changes incorporate the internal 
EU effect as well as an external EMU effect relative to other EU countries. An external EMU 
effect relative to EU countries in row (6) can be calculated as the difference between rows (5) 
and (4).  
                                                            
6 The trade diversion from trade with Non-EU countries to EU or EMU countries does not imply that there is a 
welfare loss, since the change in trade patterns is caused by transactions or information costs rather than by tariffs or 
quotas.  
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The external EMU effect relative to EU in row (6) can be compared to the external EMU 
effect in row (3). There is no obvious reason for these effects to be very different unless EMU 
and EU effects interact or the estimate of the EMU effect relative to the EU depends on 
unobservable factors. A comparison between the rows show that the two estimates of the 
external EMU effect based on data for the shorter time period are consistent while the estimates 
based on the longer time series are inconsistent and very sensitive to the sample of countries 
included in the regressions. This observation is a cause for concern with respect to the estimates 
based on data for the longer period.  
Turning to internal bilateral trade effects of EMU membership we produce two 
alternative estimates in rows (8) and (9). As noted, one estimate is the bilateral internal EMU 
effect in row (8) defined as the difference between row (7) for the percent increase in internal 
EMU trade relative to internal non-EU trade and row (4) for the internal EU effect. The estimates 
based on the longer data series are extremely large while the estimates based on the shorter time 
series are small and even negative (but clearly not statistically significant) when monetary 
regime shifts have been accounted for. These results are puzzling  
Since joining the EMU involves joining a currency union as well as a change in monetary 
regime and conduct of monetary policy a better measure of the trade enhancing effect of the 
currency union may be the difference between the percent change in bilateral trade between 
EMU countries in row (7) (relative to bilateral NonEU trade) and the percent change in bilateral 
trade between EMU and other EU countries (relative to NonEU trade) in row (5). This  
unilateral internal EMU effect in row (9) controls for the change in monetary regime and policy 
of the trading partner joining the EMU. This effect is the relevant measure of the trade expansion 
facing an EU country joining the EMU.  
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The estimate of the unilateral internal EMU effect is also very sensitive to the length of 
the estimation period. Estimates based on Table 4 regression are of the magnitude 100 percent 
while estimates based on data for the shorter period in Table 5 regressions are of the magnitude 
10 percent. It can be noted that controlling for monetary regime of both trading partners 
increases the estimate of the internal EMU effect from 8 to 13 percent.  
The very large estimates of internal EMU effects based on Table 4 regressions are 
consistent with Rose’s (2001) original estimates of currency union effects on trade. We are 
nevertheless skeptical of estimates of this magnitude, in particular, because the effects of the 
EMU on external trade between the EMU and other EU countries are very large as well. These 
effects cannot be explained by the currency union per se. It is possible that EMU effects and EU 
effects cannot be clearly disentangled and that the effects of the EMU on the conduct of 
monetary policy are not sufficiently accounted for in the monetary regime variables.  
The final row in Table 7 shows the trade effect for two countries joining a regional trade 
arrangement based on the regressions for the period 1980-2007 in Table 4. These effects are on 
the same order of magnitude as the internal EMU effects and the internal EU effect.   
[Table 7 here] 
In Table 8 trade expansion effects (exports plus imports) of different monetary regimes 
are shown in percent relative to trade between two countries belonging to the group “Other” in 
the IMF classification. The regime of the exporting country is shown horizontally while the 
regime if the importing country is shown vertically. Thus, the diagonal shows the trade effect 
when both countries belong to the same group.  A pattern emerges although the differences 
among regimes are not statistically significant in Table 6 with the exception of inflation targeting 
relative to other regimes  
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The strongest trade enhancing effect occurs when both trading partners target inflation 
(19.5 percent). Inflation targeting is also the most trade enhancing regime for exporters in trade 
with countries using other regimes (15.7 percent on the average), as well as for importers in trade 
with exporters using other regimes (13 percent on the average). While countries classified as 
adopting Other monetary regime clearly trade less than other countries, there is no clear ranking 
of trade effects of Money aggregate targeting, Exchange rate targeting and IMF supported 
regimes. Targeting a monetary anchor seems to have the second largest effect for exporters while 
ER anchor seems to have the second largest effect for importers. Thus, the only unambiguous 
conclusion we can draw from Table 8 is that inflation targeting contributes to trade expansion 
independent of the regime of the trading partner. 
[Table 8 here] 
5. Trade expansion and inflation targeting in Asia 
The analysis in the previous section indicates that the trade creation effects of regional 
integration going beyond basic trade policy can be substantial. The reduction in a variety of 
barriers to mobility of goods and services in Europe has been in process for several decades 
within the EU framework. A range of political forces arising in the aftermath of World War II 
played an important part in motivating the European countries to trade off a degree of 
sovereignty against increased political and economic integration. There are no obvious similar 
political motivations for Asian countries to emulate the European model for both widening and 
deepening integration in the foreseeable future. 
Monetary regime shifts can be implemented by a country without coordination with other 
countries. The results presented in the previous section indicate that inflation targeting, in 
particular, expands international trade even if trading partners do not adopt the same regime. In 
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this section we take a closer look at the development of international trade of inflation targeting 
countries in Asia. 
There are many case studies on emerging markets’ economic performance under inflation 
targeting. Most of these studies look at output and inflation and focus on the sample of Latin 
American and emerging transition countries. In general, these countries adopted inflation 
targeting for the purpose of disinflation.7  
The statistical evidence supporting inflation targeting as a successful monetary policy 
regime is inconclusive. Vega and Winkelried (2005), IMF (2006), and Conçalves and Salles 
(2008) suggest that developed and developing countries adopting inflation targeting have 
experienced lower inflation as well as better output performance. Ball and Sheridan (2005) argue 
that the decline in inflation after the introduction of inflation targeting in OECD countries is 
simply the result of inflation reverting to its mean after a period of relatively high inflation. They 
do not observe any output effect. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) divide the sample of non 
inflation targeting countries into control groups with different regimes in order to evaluate 
inflation targeting relative to different benchmarks. They find that the choice of control group is 
important for the results. Inflation targeting leads to reduced inflation in countries relative the 
period before inflation targeting but when these countries are compared with non-targeting 
countries there is no gain.  
 Monetary policy consideration cannot be disentangled from exchange rate policy. 
Inflation targeting requires exchange rate flexibility. When adopting inflation targeting, most 
countries accept that market fundamentals determine the exchange rates although there are 
varying degrees of foreign exchange market intervention. Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) 
                                                            
7 See, for example, see Bernanke, Lauback, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) and Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004). 
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note that under inflation targeting “exchange rate stability can be defined as a policy framework 
with an exchange rate value credible enough to convince markets that the inflation target will not 
be threatened by a currency crisis.” (p. 19). This statement implies that there are constraints on 
intervention under inflation targeting but intervention can contribute to a degree of exchange rate 
stability as long as the exchange rate is consistent with longer term fundamentals.  
 Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer find in case studies of six emerging countries8, that six of 
the countries experienced several years of sound macroeconomic policies and exchange rate 
stability after the adoption of inflation targeting. The exception was Brazil where the exchange 
rate was under pressure in 1999.  
 Rose (2007) find that exchange rate volatility of inflation targeting countries is relatively 
low. He uses cross-sectional analysis of 42 industrialized and emerging market based on monthly 
data for exchange rates for the period 1990-2005. Edwards (2006) finds that the adoption of 
inflation targeting did not increase nominal and real exchange rate volatility. 
 The performance of inflation targeting countries in terms of real exchange rate volatility 
as well as general macroeconomic stability can contribute to the trade expansion associated with 
inflation targeting as noted in the previous section.   
 Turning to experiences with inflation targeting in Asia, four countries have adopted this 
regime as of 2009 as shown in Table 3. The four countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, South 
Korea and Thailand. Indonesia shifted from monetary aggregate targeting to inflation targeting in 
2005. The Philippines made the same shift in 2003, South Korea in 2001. Thailand shifted from 
an IMF supported regime9 to inflation targeting in 2001. The Philippines and South Korea are 
                                                            
8 Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Israel, Poland, and South Africa.  
9 See Table 2 for definitions of regimes 
 
 
19
considered independently floating while Indonesia and Thailand intervene to dampen exchange 
rate fluctuations.  
 Table 3 shows the exchange rate and monetary regimes for other Asian countries as well.      
China, Hong Kong and Singapore are exchange rate anchor countries. India and Malaysia are 
classified by IMF as adopting “Other” monetary regime in combination with managed floating. 
In other words, the latter countries have neither a pegged exchange rate nor a floating rate. 
Although they do not announce an exchange rate target they are likely to have one.    
 Figure 1 shows how the volume of exports and the ratio of exports to GDP developed 
before and after the adoption of inflation targeting in Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines and 
Indonesia. The volume of exports increased in all the countries before as well as after the regime 
shift until the financial crisis in 2008 caused a decline in exports. The export ratio, on the other 
hand, seems to have declined for a period after the adoption of inflation targets in all the four 
countries. The decline seems to have been temporary in Thailand and South Korea but the 
declines in the Philippines and Indonesia look like trends.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 On the face of it the patterns in Figure 1 seem to contradict the empirical results 
presented in the previous section. However, the patterns could be explained if the shift to 
inflation targeting also caused real exchange rate adjustment. Figure 2 shows real exchange rate 
developments and ratios of exports to GDP in nine Asian countries. The real exchange rates of 
both Indonesia and the Philippines have been appreciating and the export ratios have been 
declining since the countries adopted inflation targets. South Korea’s export ratio fell to begin 
with along with an appreciating currency after the adoption of inflation targeting in 2001 but 
since 2003 the export ratio has been increasing in spite of an appreciating real exchange rate. 
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Thailand also began a period of real appreciation at the time of the shift to inflation targeting in 
2001 but the trendwise increase in the export ratio continued for most of the period.  
 Observation of the diagrams in Figure 2 alone gives the impression of a negative effect 
on the export ratio of inflation targeting. Thus, the positive effect on trade of the inflation target 
regime observed in the analysis in the previous section is conditional on controlling for real 
exchange rate changes. The shift to inflation targeting may cause a real appreciation for a period 
because the monetary regime shift is often associated with a shift towards a more disciplined 
macroeconomic policy. The real appreciation should be temporary, however. Therefore, the trade 
creating effect of a shift to inflation targeting may not be observable during an adjustment 
period. 
 [Figure 2 here] 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Searching for a stable monetary regime is a challenge for central bankers around the world and a 
crucial issue among Asian policymakers for two reasons. First, Asian crisis-hit economies during 
1997-98 were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate system. Since then, the exchange rates 
of most Asian countries have been floating more or less freely. Second, in the past two decades 
Asian economies have experienced a marked increased in international trade and capital flows 
particularly from, and lately to, developed countries. Although openness often improves long-run 
macroeconomic performance, it may expose countries to the risks of economic and financial 
disruption in times of global shocks. Choosing the right monetary and exchange rate regimes can 
be critical for alleviating the effects of external shocks and enhancing the prospects for long-term 
export led economic growth. 
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 The European model for deeper regional monetary integration and increased monetary 
stability may seem attractive. The evidence presented here and in other papers indicates that the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) has contributed to increased trade but the magnitude of the 
internal trade creating effects remain controversial and estimates range from very large in the 
order of magnitude of 100 percent to small and almost negligible. It has proven difficult to 
disentangle currency union effects from long term trends of increased integration within the 
internal market, and to disentangle the effects of the creation of a currency union from effects of 
simultaneous shifts in the monetary regimes and the conduct of monetary policy in the countries 
joining the currency union.  
 The estimates of very large trade creating effects of the EMU in regressions for the 
period 1980-2007 are associated with large trade effects relative to countries outside the currency 
union as well. We take that as an indication that other factors than the creation of the currency 
union per se explain most of the trade creation. Effects of deepening of the internal market and of 
changes in the conduct of monetary policy may be particularly important. 
 The political circumstances that led to deepened integration, including monetary 
integration are not easily reproduced. Even if the political will for increased economic 
integration exists the most immediate gains are likely to follow from the reduction of barriers to 
mobility of goods, services and factors of production. There is no strong evidence that a currency 
union contributes much to such mobility. The choice of monetary regime as well as the conduct 
of monetary policy matter, however. The results presented here indicate that inflation targeting 
contributes substantially to trade. The trade creating effects of the EMU may also be partly 
explained by the shift to inflation targeting by the European Central Bank for countries that prior 
to the EMU had central banks with low credibility.  
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Figure 1. Exports/GDP during the pre- and post adoption of inflation targeting regimes for four 
Asian countries, quarterly data, 1993:Q1 – 2008: Q4 
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Note: The date for the adoption of the inflation targeting regime is from Rose (2007).
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Figure 2. Real Exchange Rates (relative to the U.S. dollar) and Exports for our sample of Asian 
Economies 
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Table 2. Data Descriptions and Sources 
Real exports The logarithm of the real value (in US dollar) of bilateral exports (the nominal values of 
bilateral exports are adjusted to the real values using the U.S. GDP deflator (2005=100)). 
Sources: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, August 2009 and the International Financial 
Statistics. 
Real GDP The log of the real GDP. Source: The Penn World Table, PWT 6.3. 
Population The log of the total population. Source: The Penn World Table, PWT 6.3. 
RTA A dummy of one if a pair of countries belong to the same regional trade arrangement. RTAs 
include ASEAN-Association of South East Asia (1992), CAN-Andean Community (1998), 
MERCOSUR-Southern Common Market (1991), NAFTA-North American Free Trade 
Agreement (1994), CER-Closer Economic Relation (1983), and SAPTA-South Asian 
Preferential Trade Agreement (1995). European Union is not included because dummies for 
member countries are included in the EU/EMU dummies.  Source: Information on RTAs is 
from the WTO website. 
Real ER The real exchange rate (RER) is the nominal exchange rate relative to U.S. dollars 
(2005=100) adjusted by the relative price index (2005=100). Source: Nominal exchange rate 
is from the Penn World Table, PWT 6.3 
ER Anchor A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the exchange rate (ER) anchor as a 
monetary policy framework. Under ER anchor, the ER serves as the nominal anchor or 
intermediate target of monetary policy and monetary authority stands ready to buy or sell 
foreign exchange to maintain the exchange rate at its pre-announced level or range. 
Exchange rate regimes with no separate legal tender, currency board arrangements, fixed 
pegs with and without bands, and crawling pegs with and without bands are covered under 
the ER anchor regime. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Monetary Policy Frameworks 
Money Anchor A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the monetary aggregate anchor as a 
monetary policy framework. Under this framework, the targeted monetary aggregate serves 
as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary policy. The monetary authority 
uses its instruments to achieve a target growth rate for a monetary aggregate, such as reserve 
money, M1, or M2. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Monetary Policy Framework 
Inflation 
Targeting (IT) 
A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the inflation targeting (IT) framework. 
Under IT, the monetary authority announces medium-term numerical targets for inflation, 
which is the intermediate target of monetary policy, and commits to use its instruments to 
achieve the announced target.  Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 
IMF A dummy of one in the years that a country uses the monetary and exchange rate policies 
that are guided and supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Source: IMF’s 
Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 
Other (MP 
regime) 
A dummy of one in the years that a country uses other monetary policy framework. 
According to IMF, this includes a country that has no explicitly stated nominal anchor but 
rather monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy, or there is no relevant 
information available for the country. Source: IMF’s Classification of Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks 
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Table 3. Exchange Rate- and Monetary Regimes for Asian Countries 
Country Year Exchange Rate Regimes Monetary Policy Regimes 
China 1999-2006 Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements 
Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single 
currency) and Monetary Aggregate 
 2007 Crawling pegs Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single currency) and Monetary Aggregate 
 2008-present Crawling pegs Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single currency) 
Hong Kong 1999-present Currency Board Arrangements Exchange Rate Anchor  
India 1999 Independently Floating Monetary Aggregate 
 2000 Independently Floating Other 
 2001-present Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Other 
Indonesia 1999-2001 Independently Floating IMF 
 2002-2003 Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Monetary Aggregate and IMF 
 2004-2006 Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Monetary Aggregate  
 2007-present Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Inflation Targeting Framework 
Korea 1999-2000 Independently Floating Monetary Aggregate and IMF 
 2001-present Independently Floating Inflation Targeting Framework 
Malaysia 1999-2005 Other Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements 
Exchange Rate Anchor (against a single 
currency) 
 2006-2007 Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Other 
Philippines 1999-2002 Independently Floating Monetary Aggregate and IMF 
 2003-present Independently Floating Inflation Targeting Framework 
Singapore 1999-2007 Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Other 
 2008-present Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate 
Exchange Rate Anchor (against a 
composite) 
Thailand 1999-2000 Independently Floating IMF 
 2001 Independently Floating Inflation Targeting Framework 
 2002-present Managed Floating with No Pre-announced Path for Exchange Rate Inflation Targeting Framework 
Source: De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks, International 
Monetary Fund. 
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Table 4. The EMU and EU Effects on Exports, 1980-2007 
 IND 
 
ALL 
 Coefficient Std Err  Coefficient Std Err 
Log of Real GDP1 1.103** 0.070  1.297** 0.017 
Log of Real GDP2 1.233** 0.070  0.984** 0.017 
Log of Population1 -1.598** 0.224  -1.053** 0.038 
Log of Population2 -0.471** 0.224  -1.013** 0.038 
Real ER1 0.061* 0.035  -0.0004** 0.0001 
Real ER2 -0.081** 0.035  -0.00001 0.0001 
RTA 0.249 0.162  0.317** 0.051 
EMU1 to EMU2 0.602** 0.044  0.565** 0.035 
EMU1 to EU/nonEMU2 0.163** 0.044  0.346** 0.030 
EMU1 to NonEU2 0.230** 0.047  0.018 0.021 
EU/nonEMU1 to EMU2 0.412** 0.044  0.349** 0.030 
EU/nonEMU1 to EU/nonEMU2 0.123** 0.029  0.127** 0.020 
EU/nonEMU1 to NonEU2 0.088** 0.026  -0.095** 0.013 
NonEU1 to EMU2 -0.026 0.047  -0.111** 0.022 
NonEU1 to EU/nonEMU2 0.060** 0.026  -0.115** 0.013 
Constant -19.318** 0.000  -19.100** 0.677 
      
No. of Observations 11,981  101,697 
No. of Country Pairs 462  4,289 
F-Statistics 214.64  677.15 
Prob > F-Statistics 0.000  0.000 
Within R-Square 0.446  0.408 
Country Pair Dummy Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy Yes  Yes 
Emerging market Dummy ×  
Year Dummy No 
 Yes 
The dependent variable is the log of real exports. *, **  indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%, 
respectively. 1 stands for an exporting country and 2 for an importing country. For the sample, IND = 
industrial countries and ALL = industrialized countries plus emerging markets.   
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Table 5. The EMU, EU and Monetary Regime Effects on Exports, 1999-2007 
 ALL  ALL 
 Coefficient Std Err  Coefficient Std Err 
Log of Real GDP1 0.867** 0.047  0.610** 0.052 
Log of Real GDP2 1.478** 0.047  1.198** 0.052 
Log of Population1 -1.475** 0.130  -2.035** 0.136 
Log of Population2 -1.229** 0.130  -1.839** 0.136 
Real ER1 0.028** 0.008  0.047** 0.008 
Real ER2 -0.099** 0.008  -0.077** 0.008 
EMU1 to EMU2 0.021 0.075  -0.013* 0.078 
EMU1 to EU/nonEMU2 -0.032 0.050  -0.097** 0.052 
EMU1 to NonEU2 -0.200** 0.045  -0.168** 0.046 
EU/nonEMU1 to EMU2 0.005 0.050  -0.039 0.052 
EU/nonEMU1 to EU/nonEMU2 0.090** 0.028  0.009 0.029 
EU/nonEMU1 to NonEU2 -0.025 0.020  -0.031 0.020 
NonEU1 to EMU2 -0.138** 0.045  -0.099** 0.046 
NonEU1 to EU/nonEMU2 -0.105** 0.020  -0.127** 0.020 
Inflation Targeting1    0.086** 0.015 
Money1    0.040** 0.015 
IMF1    0.027** 0.010 
ER Anchor 1    0.025** 0.012 
Inflation Targeting2    0.069** 0.015 
Money2    0.012 0.015 
IMF2    0.052** 0.010 
ER Anchor 2    0.061** 0.012 
Constant -14.089** 1.744  7.473** 2.354 
      
No. of Observations 38,599  38,599 
No. of Country Pairs 4,289  4,289 
F-Statistics 594.48  399.42 
Prob > F-Statistics 0.000  0.000 
Within R-Square 0.342  0.349 
Country Pair Dummy Yes  Yes 
Year Dummy Yes  Yes 
Emerging market Dummy ×  
Year Dummy Yes 
 Yes 
The dependent variable is the log of real exports. *, **  indicate the significance levels of 10% and 5%, 
respectively. 1 stands for an exporting country and 2 for an importing country. For the sample, IND = 
industrial countries and ALL = industrialized countries plus emerging markets. The RTA dummy is 
dropped in the country- and time- fixed effect model due to time-invariant of the data after 1999.   
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Table 6. The Wald-Test for the equality between two coefficients of monetary regimes for: 
 
Exporting countries 
 Inflation Targeting1 Money1 IMF1 
Money1 8.44  (0.0037)   
IMF1 12.41 (0.0004) 0.56 (0.4526)  
ER Anchor 1 12.20 (0.0005) 0.94 (0.3333) 0.02 (0.8762) 
 
Importing countries 
 Inflation Targeting2 Money2 IMF2 
Money2 13.14 (0.0003)   
IMF2 1.02 (0.3115) 5.11 (0.0238)  
ER Anchor2 0.20 (0.6510) 9.19 (0.0024) 0.36 (0.5504) 
The number in the parenthesis is the probability value of the F-statistics.  
 
 
 
 
33
Table 7. EU, EMU and RTA effects in percent on bilateral trade within and between members 
of different country groups (EU stands for the EU/NonEMU group). Effects on bilateral trade 
are calculated as the averages of percent change in exports and percent change in imports based 
on coefficients in log in tables 4 and 5. Rows (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) refer to percent change 
relative to trade between NonEU countries. Rows in bold font show estimates for internal and 
external effects of the EU and the EMU. Row (3) refers to differences between the changes in 
row (2) and row (1) calculated as [(100+change in row (2))/(100+change in row (1))]-1. Row 
(6) refers to difference between changes in rows (5) and row (4), row 8 refers to difference 
between rows (7) and (4) while row (9) refers to the difference between rows (7) and (5) 
Calculated from Table 4 Table 4 
Table 5  
(no 
monetary 
regime 
dummies) 
Table 5  
(Including 
monetary 
regimes 
dummies) 
Country coverage IND ALL ALL ALL 
Period 1980-2007 1980-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 
(1) Non-EU to/from EU     
(External EU-effect) +18.4 -21.5 -13.6 -16.2 
(2) Non-EU to/from EMU 
(External EU+EMU effect) +31.6 -9.2 -32.1 -26.3 
(3) Implied External EMU effect 
as difference between (2) and (1) +11.1 +15.7 -21.4 -12.1 
(4) EU to/from EU            
  (Internal EU-effect) +33 +84 +23 +2.1 
(5) EMU to/from EU           
(Internal EU effect plus External 
EMU-effect relative to EU) 
+102 +72.7 -3 -14.3 
(6) Implied External EMU effect 
relative to EU as difference 
between (5) and (4) 
+51.9 -6.1 -21.1 -16.1 
(7) EMU to/from EMU     
  (Internal EU+Internal EMU 
effect) 
+300 +267.3 +5.0 -2.9 
(8) Bilateral Internal EMU-effect 
as difference between (7) and (4) +201 +99.6 -14.6 -4.9 
(9) Unilateral Internal EMU effect 
as difference between (7) and (5)   +98 +113 +8.2 +13.2 
(9) RTA (free trade area effect) +77 +107   
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Table 8. Monetary Regime effects on exports plus imports in percent relative to trade between 
two countries classified as Other 
Exporter  ⎝  
Importer τ 
Inflation 
Targeting  Money  IMF 
ER 
Anchor  Other 
Average 
for 
importer 
regime
Inflation 
Targeting  19.5  13.4  11.8  11.6  8.6  13 
Money  12.4  6.2  4.6  4.4  1.4  5.8 
IMF  17.3  11.2  9.6  9.3  6.4  10.5 
ER Anchor  18.5  12.3  10.7  10.5  7.5  11.9 
Other  11  4.8  3.2  3  0  4.4 
Average for 
exporter 
regime 
15.7  9.6  8  7.8  4.8  9.2 
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